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K. Bourdaghs. Durham, NC:
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Pp. 376, 1 illustration. $94.95
cloth, $26.95 paper.

At a time when the so-called “death
of theory” has alternately been
celebrated or lamented (and compensated by the revival of academic
philosophy and its barren subfields
such as ethics and aesthetics), we
may well be grateful that the most
original and exciting Japanese theorist of our time, Kojin Karatani,
is finally becoming more widely
known in what we used to call the
West. With the ambitiously named
Structure of World History, indeed,
Karatani’s new work arrives in
English at virtually the same time
as its publication in Japanese. Not
only is it a new turn in his own work
and preoccupations, it opens some
welcome new paths for our own
theoretical and political discussions,
reviving a number of crucial but
virtually abandoned debates and
(hopefully) starting some new ones.
Structure of World History critically
rereads a n
 umber of classic texts in
new perspectives, combines new
uses of current theory, and reopens
the traditional debates on modes of
production in new and more productive directions, taking controversial political positions, as well
as philosophical ones, particularly
on the relationship of Immanuel
Kant to Marxism; in short, not only
does it revive a much-maligned
approach to h
 istory (world history,
the philosophy of history, etc.),
it also intervenes in economics,
Marxology, theory, and philosophy
itself.
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Karatani’s preceding book
Transcritique: On Kant and Marx
(1995) had already proposed a new
approach to Kant, one unusual
and unexpected even in the midst
of what looks like a generalized
Kant revival. We are far from the
days in which Jean-Paul Sartre
remarked that any return to Kant
always marked a regression to preMarxist and anti-Marxist positions
(a proposition that surely retains
much of its relevance). It is at least
not true of Karatani, whose strategic move lies not in using Kant
against Hegel and the dialectic,
but rather (at least on my reading)
one who invents the dialectic in the
first place by way of the antinomies, thereby confirming the more
traditional dialectic’s impatience
with the pettiness of the law of
noncontradiction and abandoning
the attribution to Kant of the 1763
refutation of the existence of negativity in nature as such.
Two more interesting features
of Kant emerge in the earlier
book: the ideal of the world
republic, which becomes central
in Structure of World History; and
the overcoming of the impasse
of the Ding-an-sich (thing-initself) and the unknowability of
the real by way of the figure of
the parallax, an attractive astronomical conception that seems to
be making its way in contemporary philosophy (for example, in
Slavoj Žižek’s work) as a result of
Karatani’s speculation.

For the more standard “enlightenment” view, Kant subscribed to
a view of so-called transcendental
realities as being fundamentally
unknowable (however much we
may still require them ethically).
The figure of the parallax, however, suggests that we can nonetheless deduce the position and
the volume of such realities, as it
were, blindly and by indirect computation, even where we can never
confront them directly or in some
unmediated way. The shift at issue
here is one from metaphysics to representationality, and it has indeed
seemed to me a useful index to the
difference between modernity and
postmodernity: for modernity, this
failure of knowledge or representation was an agonizing experience,
which in literature and philosophy
alike led to grandiose schemes and
forms for its evasion—forms that
constituted a kind of triumph over
it. For postmodernity, this particular “death of god” is no longer so
fraught with anguish, and the antirepresentationality of the parallax
has seemed to offer a new form of
representation as such at the very
moment of its impossibility.
But the other (non-Kantian)
originality of Transcritique—and
the one that led most directly to
the present work—was a revision
of Karl Marx that seemed to offer
a new kind of political praxis—
namely, the cooperative movement at the base, or dare I say in
the interstices, of actually existing
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capitalism. Some will remember
that Lenin’s very last writings were
devoted to cooperatives and to the
praise of Robert Owen. Others will
object that the central polemic of
Capital—at least on the left and
against Proudhon—was the slashing and omnipresent attack on
the idea that circulation could be
the central framework for understanding capital as such let alone
for changing it: production, for
Marx, always comes first, and new
value cannot be created in circulation. The very subtitle of Structure
of World History would seem to
suggest that Karatani thinks otherwise, and to that effect I quote a
crucial sentence from Transcritique:
“While capital organizes social
relations globally, the moment to
overturn capital—inexorably at the
same time as following it—is folded
within, namely, in the process of
circulation” (293). This would seem
to be a serious practical issue, particularly inasmuch as the dominant
ideology of our time—free-market
dogma—is clearly a fundamentally
circulationist one.
But I’m not personally scandalized by this heterodoxy, this
heretical—and indeed traditionally
heretical—displacement of Marxist
orthodoxy. What interests me more
is the way in which Karatani has
arrived at this point (which in his
formulation I hasten to say is neither anti-Marxist, post-Marxist, or
indeed pre-Marxist)—namely, by
way of the whole matter of modes
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of production, which does interest
me greatly and to which I devote
the rest of this discussion.
Let me briefly summarize the
history of the problem, which
Marx himself alludes to as follows (in the 1859 preface to A
Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy): “In broad outline the Asiatic, ancient, feudal,
and modern bourgeois modes of
production
[Produktionsweisen]
may be designated as epochs
marking progress in the economic
development of society.”1 The
syntax thereby implies that these
four modes of production would
be completed by a fifth—namely,
that from which progress has been
made or, in other words, primitive
communism. Meanwhile, the very
thrust of Marxism as a theory and
a praxis alike suggests the need to
specify a sixth mode of production,
the one that closes off the series of
“antagonistic forms,” as he calls
them, and brings “the prehistory
of human society” to an end—
namely, socialism or communism.
This is, however, clearly a list and
not even a description, let alone
a theory (or “philosophy of history” as it is contemptuously called
nowadays). But what people did
not know for eighty years was that
Marx had indeed written a substantial account of these modes of
production in his 1857 manuscript,
that trial run of Capital, which we
call the Grundrisse (floorplans) and
which was not published until 1939.
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Nonetheless, and in whatever
form, it is surely this list of the fundamental structures of human society that has earned Marxism (and
Hegelianism before it) the most
virulent contemporary attacks on
its alleged teleology and its imputed
idealistic reading of the meaning
of history as such. To be sure, real
historical developments account
for the widespread appeal of such
attacks, not least the omnipresence
of late capitalism (which Francis
Fukuyama thought could justify
the relevance of a slogan such as
“the end of history”), as well as the
collapse of state socialism, which
seemed to invalidate Marxian
teleological notions of the ways
in which socialism was coming
into being within capitalism itself.
Scarcely irrelevant either is the contemporary emphasis on state power
and its emergence (or omnipresence) in so far as that casts a different kind of light on the other end of
the sequence of “modes of production”—namely, on the notion of socalled primitive communism.
But perhaps two deeper theoretical trends need to be mentioned in any discussion of this
much-maligned form or genre
called “universal history,” to which
Karatani makes so interesting a
new contribution here. On the one
hand, we have to remember the
fundamental tension or antagonism between the historical and the
sociological or structural, and the
consequent unwillingness to reduce

unique historical facts or events to
philosophical or theoretical frameworks or abstractions—universal
history then becoming one more
example of that bad thing called
totalization. On the other hand, it
is precisely fear of Eurocentrism
and its universalism, the sense that
other cultures and their histories,
their specificities, are being reduced
to a single matrix, that is a fantasy of
Western provenance. I believe that
we can locate the scandal here in
geography itself, in the contingencies of our own unique globe and
its spatial configurations. (They are
contingent only from the historical
perspective and not from the geological or astrophysical one.) Thus,
universal history turns out to be
an attempt to philosophize geography, to make philosophical sense
out of its unique spatial folds and
configurations. Thus, Hegel felt
obliged, in the greatest and most
scandalous of all universal histories, to find dialectical meaning in
the landscapes in which his various
world spirits originated, thereby
giving rise to often grotesque kinds
of landscape symbolism or allegory. My favorite is the moment
in which he explains that, in contrast to the Nile or the Rhine, the
immense rivers of the Americas —
the Amazon, the Orinoco, the
Mississippi—somehow express in
their very o verwhelming formlessness the youth and newness of the
New World, as such. But surely the
philosophizing of geography is still
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as illicit and as scandalous as it was
in Hegel’s day?
I want to take as an emblem
of the transformation of this situation in our own time the figure
of Immanuel Wallerstein, whose
own universal history is very precisely based on a philosophizing
or theorization of landscape in his
notions of core, semiperiphery, and
periphery.2 To be sure, he is the
inheritor or synthesizer of many
contemporary trends—Fernand
Braudel’s historical vision of the
Mediterranean, dependency theory
in Latin America, radical geography, and ecology—in this sense,
he epitomizes the spatial turn in
modern thought. But he also benefits from globalization or, in other
words, the subsumption by capitalism of all those far reaches of the
globe that once were outside the
boundaries of the capitalist market
system: this is to turn the reproach
of Eurocentrism inside out and to
grasp Europe as simply a marker
for the uniquely dynamic and selfperpetuating autopoietic virus of
capitalism, as such; it is also to make
new research into Europe’s others
possible as spaces whose ability to
resist the emergence of capitalism
becomes an important object of
inquiry in its own right.
At any rate, I will argue
that Karatani’s assimilation of
Wallerstein endows his new version of universal history with a
relevance and a plausibility that
the older, more purely cultural
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syntheses could never have. In
particular, this new global framework lends his treatment of
culture—here concentrated in

the emphasis on religion (and on
world religions)—a unique opportunity to rethink much of our
cultural past, as well.
Karatani’s place in all this,
however, will no doubt be exacerbated, not merely by his revival of
the modes of production debate in
general, but also by his seemingly
idealistic revival of Kant’s appeal to
a world republic that could alone
secure universal peace.
Late capitalism, which already
has of course its own not at all
Utopian world market, has not
encouraged “one-world” fantasies
of the type so current after World
War II. But it might all have been
otherwise: in a forgotten yet unforgettable exercise in counterfactual history, Arnold J. Toynbee
sketched out what might have happened had Megalexandros not died
so young and been able to pursue
his restless Homeric vision to the
pillars of Hercules and perhaps,
in a second attempt, persuaded his
soldiers to venture down the Silk
Road. Then, a new multicultural
world empire might have ensued,
with its two official languages—
Greek and Persian—its offerings
to the Olympians (in the welcome
absence of the bloodthirsty monotheisms), and its peaceful rule
by the Alexander XXXVII of
the present day.3 He does not say
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whether that empire would have
known c apitalism: whether, to use
Wallenstein’s language, it would
eventually have undergone a mutation from world empire to world
system; but it is a question scarcely
addressed by Kant either, and one
that once again demonstrates the
vanity of purely political speculations when devoid of economic
considerations, such as the swelling reserve army of the unemployed, the closing of the frontier
(otherwise called “the falling rate
of profit”), and the incessant emergence of new forms of “primitive
accumulation” within the apparently mature, completed system
whose new features some have
already begun to theorize. At any
rate, pre-
Alexandrian Greece is
there to remind us that multiple
states always mean warfare, something that does not necessarily
guarantee its absence from the universal empire as such.
As for the other end of the historical spectrum, in Marx’s own
lifetime, the omitted mode—
namely,
primitive
communism—was suddenly brought to
unexpected life by an American,
Lewis Henry Morgan, in his 1877
book Ancient Society, which Claude
Lévi-Strauss hailed as the foundational act of anthropology, as
such, with its extensive account of
that complex, yet at that time altogether unsuspected, form of social
organization called the kinship system. Marx devoted the final years

of his life to exploring this newly
discovered continent of human
social organization in his so-called
Anthropological Notebooks, which
Engels wrote up in his 1888 c lassic
“The Family, Private Property
and the State,” the latter then, for
another fifty years or more, standing as the fundamental statement of
Marxist orthodoxy on history and
the modes of production, as such.
The problem is that this work does
not square with the description
Marx made in the Grundrisse, and
Morgan’s extraordinary celebration of the Iroquois gens as the most
perfect human society so far in history does not quite fit into Marx’s
list, save as a kind of second state
of so-called primitive communism
(the first one being the Paleolithic
life of hunters and gatherers). In
effect, Morgan’s and Engels’ encomia to this “military democracy” of
the Iroquois sets our problem off
in a new direction—namely, that
of the problem of the emergence
of the state and of state power—
which will now deflect the economic problematic of the original
Marxian “modes of production” as
we shall see in a moment.
Yet, before 1939 (or perhaps we
should say, before 1953, when the
Grundrisse became more widely
available), the principal object of
debate and contestation was the
concept of an Asiatic mode of production, which Marx does indeed
briefly touch on in Capital and
which specifies a stagnant, virtually
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unchanging world of isolated villages capped by the rule of the despot
to whom all land belongs and who
is supported by an imperial bureaucracy without a traditional nobility
or aristocracy.4 Perry Anderson,
in a destructive and fairly definitive historical review, has demonstrated the origin, via Hegel, of this
stereotype in Montesquieu, who
based it on the Ottoman Empire,
buttressed by imperfect travel narratives on Moghul India.5 We may
ignore the East/West prejudice of
the term Asiatic; and indeed more
recent scholarship—most notably
that of Maurice Godelier—has
revived this concept for other parts
of the world, most notably the Inca
Empire. The problem with removing this particular mode of production from the active list is that in
that case you are left with nothing
but feudalism as far as the eye can
see. Feudalism, then, like the petty
bourgeoisie, becomes one of the
most tiresome of orthodox Marxian
stereotypes. It should be noted that
one of the most interesting problems involved in Marx’s original
excursus lies in the multiple ways in
which he links the various “modes”
to one another, suggesting alternate
thematic links that turn this seemingly chronological (or diachronic)
list into a multidimensional constellation of forms. Thus, the unity
of primitive communism is in Marx
paired with the Asiatic mode in a
Hegelian fashion: each one incarnates the One of the society without
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individualism; only the one or unity
of the primitive village is now projected outward and upward into
the one of the despot who is in
that Hegelian sense the only individual, the only concrete subject in
that social formation. On the other
hand, the self-sufficiency of the
isolated village can also be seen to
migrate alternately into the form
of the Greek city-state or the more
rural isolation of the Germanic
village—from which then feudalism seemingly arises. Both of these
outcomes remain Hegelian in their
opposition of universality and particularity; but where in the earlier
version, the identification of village
and despot fails to produce the individuality of its multiple subjects,
the distance between universal
and particularity in the German,
and later the feudal, form leads to
an individuality that will reach its
fullest realization only in the social
atomization of capitalism. Still, its
multiple centers must take the path
of an antagonism towards each
other, and paradoxically Karatani
the sees the structural and wellnigh eternal warfare between them
as yet another kind of Hegelian
reciprocity. Marx thereby already
grasps war as an integral and structural creature of primitive communism and not merely some external
accident, which is a discovery that
Pierre Clastres and, in his different way, René Girard both thought
supplied ammunition against
Marx.
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Yet, the despot himself returns,
as we shall see, and becomes a
figure for state power, a function
retained in Karatani’s work, who
views the state as essentially a matter of the looting and plundering of
the foreign or nomadic conqueror
from whom the state evolves (modern taxes being a civilized form of
such plunder or tribute).
In the postwar period, and after
the publication of the Grundrisse
and its exposition of the very concept of the mode of production, a
new set of debates emerges. In the
immediate postwar, which can be
said to extend up to the failure of
the 1960s, let’s say around 1975,
we have a Utopian celebration of
primitive communism, as LéviStrauss derives it from Jean-Jacques
Rousseau: I am extremely happy to
find a discussion here, in Karatani’s
work, of that great Utopian classic
that is Marshall Sahlins’s Stone Age
Economics (1972), supplemented by
the inevitable structuralist adopted
classic, Marcel Mauss’s book on the
gift. But this Utopian moment is
itself a reflex of the obsession with
the state and with the emergence of
state power, which can easily take a
negative turn after 1968, as it ultimately does in Michel Foucault’s
work and in the various anarchist
fixations with power as such, which
both politically and theoretically
serve to distract us from the fundamentally economic problem of capitalism as Marx diagnosed it. The
Utopian upward slope of the period

before the state is then matched
with the triumph of the state by
a decidedly dystopian downward
path into the innumerable apocalyptic scenarios with which mass
culture today is peopled, or unpeopled, as you prefer.
Meanwhile, at least until
recently, the matter of socialism or
communism as a mode of production has vanished from theoretical
view, as seemingly has the Utopian
nature of primitive societies, just
as both social formations seem to
have vanished from real life and
from the actually existing (dare I
say, dystopian) world of globalized
capitalism.
But it is here that Karatani’s book
takes an interesting turn, and that
Kant returns in unexpected form,
precisely as the theorist of a new
form of globalization in his famous
essay on universal peace and the
world republic. Here he meets the
Marx of the world m
 arket—that
outer limit of capitalism which is its
most fundamental and destructive
contradiction—and Wallerstein,
whose replacement of the Asiatic
mode as the world empire with
capitalism as the world system has,
as I’ve already said, done so much
to invent a radical geography for
a Marxism in which it was only
implicit, and only anticipated in a
fragmentary way in Lenin’s theory
of imperialism.
Now let me summarize what
I take to be the originalities of
Karatani’s synthesis—first of all,
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a modification in the object of our
study, which was once called a
“mode of production.” The standard Marxian, and also structural
Marxian, schema of this object was
a system of levels: first the level of
the base or infrastructure and then
the level of the superstructures.
The latter were multiple and could
be identified as the ideological, religious or philosophical superstructure, the juridical superstructure,
the political superstructure (assuming that you position politics as a
superstructure), and so forth. The
former—the base—is essentially
made up of two levels: that of the
relations of production (classes,
for example, property relations)
and that of the forces of production (technology and productivity).
The most rigorous and consequent
Althusserians—Barry Hindess and
Paul Hirst—then defined a mode
of production as specific articulation of these two levels upon each
other. There are as many different
modes of production, according to
them, as there are distinct forms
of such articulation—the crucial
question thereby emerging as to
what exactly an articulation is and
what you mean by “to articulate.”6
Karatani has at any rate
replaced this system with another,
more striking, but perhaps equally
structural one—namely, Jacques
Lacan’s Borromean knots, in which
three circles are inseparably intertwined. For capitalism, he insists
that these three circles are to be

335

identified as the State, the Nation,
and Capitalism as the law of value
or commodity exchange. Now the
question addressed to the older
paradigm was always what the
ultimately determining level is, and
the short answer, as far as Marxism
was concerned, was always the
economic: production, or, in other
words, the base. But remember
that, given the dual nature of the
base, this ultimately determining
instance could always be ambiguously inflected, either toward the
forces of production, in which case
you come up with technological
determinism (the industrial revolution and so forth) or one of relations (which might most often be
the social classes, but which could
slip off into these or that idealist or
culturalist deviation).
In Karatani’s work, it is not
possible to evade the economic
circles: attention to the state then
also secures the political questions,
the questions of power, but here
a problem arises: for the mode
of production that precedes state
power—primitive communism—
what fills this role, what constitutes
this particular circle? Or does the
Borromean scheme not yet exist at
that point? As for the third circle,
the Nation, its equivalent in the
older modes is clear enough; beginning with the kinship system, it
is what secures the existence of
the community, whether imagined or not. In certain systems,
two of these three dimensions get
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identified with each other, and we
have the Nation-State. Is it possible
to imagine a system in which the
place of community is conceived
as being vaster than the Nation, as
such? Is this then the role of Kant’s
world republic, of an association of
nations or a supranational entity
of some sort (one that is neither a
Wallersteinian world-empire nor
that capitalist world-system we call
globalization)? It is with this question that the book ends.
However, we must now
observe that Karatani’s tripartite
scheme is shadowed by a fourth
term, sometimes here identified
as religion. Clearly, in the present state of things, where militant
or fundamentalist religion has
replaced the secular parties as the
only active, violent force for revolutionary change, it is altogether
fitting for religion to take its
place in the analysis, functioning
as what I would more generally
term ideology—that is, the driving
superstructural force for legitimation of the various modes of
production. But, clearly enough,
religion is something a little more
concrete and existential, a little
more collective and social, than
some mere philosophical value.
To see where this fits, we need
to retrace our steps and review
again the sequence of the modes
of production as Karatani outlines
them, and also to grasp why he
should wish to substitute the term
“exchange” for “production” in the

formula while always insisting
that exchange here means not
only capitalist circulation but a
larger, more all-encompassing
economic category—an e mphasis
Marx argues tirelessly against in
his polemics against Proudhon
and the latter’s version of associationist anarchism. And in that
respect, of course, Karatani does
reveal himself to be fully as much
a follower of Proudhon as of Marx
himself.
As I’ve said, Karatani’s history
follows a traditional sequence:
societies before power (clan or
tribal societies, primitive communism); power societies, in which the
state exists; and finally capitalism
as a society organized not so much
around power relations as around
economic and monetary categories. But, over each of these forms
presides what we may call a mode
of extraction (if you don’t like the
word “exchange”). Primitive communism is the world of Marcel
Mauss’s gift, of what Karatani calls
reciprocity or pooling (it has several forms, but we omit those); in
power societies, often constructed
on the basis of conquest, distribution takes the form of plunder
and looting (Republicans would,
I think, welcome this notion of
the state and its taxation as a form
of plunder and theft); capitalism
is then organized grosso modo
as what we can call commodity exchange. Now it is clear that
just as the structuralists liked to
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specify the individual social formations as combinations of several
modes of production all at once, so
also Karatani conceives of the persistence of earlier kinds of social
relations or modes of exchange
in this sense of social interaction
within later stages. Thus, the
mode of reciprocity persists at
some deeper, more repressed level
within power society and then the
capitalist one, whereas power itself
clearly persists within capitalism’s
more purely economic arrangements. Here Karatani develops a
new concept of historical repetition in order to conceptualize such
returns of the repressed, very often
detectable in the emergence, or
shall we say eruption, of the great
universal religions (among which
I take it he includes Marxism or
communism itself).
So now we can better understand where religion fits in
Karatani’s scheme and how a
fourth term might emerge from his
scheme without any accompanying specific mode of production to
ground it. The universal religion in
general marks the return, the repetition, the eruption, or repressed
force of reciprocity into systems
organized to replace it (with power
and domination or with unequal
distribution and exploitation). It
is generally transmitted by great
prophecy and takes on an ethical or
moralizing form (even though its
metaphysical or superstitious figuration in reality carries a radically
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different and more concrete type of
social relationship within it).
The premise here is, on the one
hand, the proposition that each
social system includes a mechanism to ward off and preempt its
own dissolution, a kind of self-
preservation or immune response
that neutralizes the effects of potential revolutionary change. Thus,
the later modes of social organization have had somehow to disable
such mechanisms in order to supersede their predecessors: repetition
and the return of the repressed
then mark moments in which—for
good or ill, it should be noted—
one of those older layers then, for
whatever structural reason or on
whatever uniquely propitious conjuncture, comes back to life.
The cooperative scheme, reciprocity, pooling, and their various
equivalents in contemporary times
seem to Karatani to represent such a
return of the repressed. At any rate,
this antagonistic layering of the
social archaeology can usefully be
compared to Bloch’s nonsynchronous synchronicity in a new and
fruitful way; and indeed it seems to
me that the political uses of the new
Utopian movement are both drawn
on here and enhanced by this conception of the deep social, which,
far from being anthropomorphic,
in fact suggests that our representations of the individual and the subjective or psychic are in fact enabled
by a social objectivity from which
they draw their figuration (as with
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Sigmund Freud’s archaeological
accounts of the unconscious). Social
being comes first, and existential
experience draws on its possibilities for its own self-understanding
(in much the same way, I would
argue, as the discoveries of science
are enabled in their very structure
by new forms of the organization
of social life).
Thus, Karatani’s work concludes with immediate, and surely
immensely controversial, proposals
for a new and concrete politics for
the present day and our current situation. Those will no doubt receive
further attention of a critical or exegetical nature. But I should like to
close with a more general remark
on the value for us of such speculations on modes of production long
extinct and surely belonging to a
history that no longer concerns us.
Indeed, Hindess and Hirst, in that
most rigorous of all monuments
to Althusserian scientific thinking
(Precapitalist Modes of Production,
1975), conclude in their painstaking interrogation of the various
concepts of modes of production
that not only is this concept not historical, but even that “the study of
history is not only scientifically but
also politically valueless.” As over
against their Master, who called
for a new “science of history,”
they observe that “it is the notion
of a Marxist history, of a Marxism
confined within the conditions
of the historian’s practice, which
is the contradictory enterprise….

The object of history, the past, no
matter how it is conceived, cannot
affect present conditions. Historical
events do not exist and can have
no material effectivity in the present.”7 This astonishing conclusion,
which in fact spells the end of the
entire Althusserian enterprise (and
appropriately results in the authors’
renunciation of Marxism, as such),
is admirably predicated on the
insistence that Marxism, if it is to be
anything, must be part of a political and not merely epistemological
praxis. And their stumbling block
was, to be sure, the failure of the
theory of modes of production to
conceptualize transition, or in other
words a revolution that could lead
from one system to another, radically different one. They’re right,
and we should continue to work
on that.
But before Hindess and Hirst
reached that sorry point in their
rigorous argumentation—either
unfinished business or outright
renunciation—earlier in their
book, they had achieved a rather
remarkable description of primitive communism as a mode of production (a determinate articulation,
you will remember of the forces
and the relations of production),
thus integrating Marx and Morgan.
They thereby demonstrate the way
in which, in what they call complex redistribution, the relations
of production (the kinship system)
articulates the forces of production
(or a certain stage of productive
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metabolism with the earth). The
political level, the level of power, the
level of the state, as such, is omitted
from this interaction between the
two essential levels, and the possibility of a comparable “withering
away of the state” is projected into
the concept of socialism or communism, as well.
But I prefer to end on another
note, which might well tempt us
to juxtapose Karatani’s practical
conclusions with rather different
but related ones. I therefore conclude with the peroration of Lewis
Henry Morgan’s Ancient Society,
in which that blood brother of the
Iroquois and enthusiastic admirer
of the Paris Commune, evoking
“the next higher plane of society to
which experience, intelligence and
knowledge are already tending,”
cries, “It will be a revival, in higher
form, of the liberty, equality and
fraternity of the ancient gentes.”8
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